Water Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 10

9-1-2002

Third Update to Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview
Gregory J. Hobbs Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Third Update to Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 6 U. Denv. Water L.
Rev. 116 (2002).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

ARTICLE UPDATE
THIRD UPDATE TO
COLORADO WATER LAW AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law
information, the editors periodically include updates of works
previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is the
third update to Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, AppendixColorado Water Law: A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law,' selected by the
Honorable GregoryJ. Hobbs,Jr.
Park County Water Pres. Coalition v. Columbine Assoc.
"Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns 'the court's authority to deal
with the class of cases in which it renders judgment.'. . . [W]e have
held that subject-matter jurisdiction vests in the water court upon the
timely filing of the application and publication of the resume notice."
Park County Water Pres. Coalition v. Columbine Assoc., 993 P.2d 483, 488 (Colo.
2002) (citations omitted).

"The reasonableness of the notice is determined by applying an
inquiry standard-whether the notice is sufficient to reveal to potential
parties the nature of the claim being made, so that such parties can
determine whether to conduct further inquiry into the full extent of
those claims so a determination can be made whether to participate in
the proceedings."
Id. at 489-90 (citation omitted).

"'Consequently, alleged deficiencies invalidate the resume only if
the resume taken as a whole is insufficient to inform or put the reader
on inquiry of the nature, scope, and impact of the proposed
diversion."'
Id. at 490 (citation omitted).

1. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to Justice Hobbs' article appears at 2 U.
DENY. WATER L. REv. 223 (1999) and the second update is at 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv.

111 (2000).
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"Here, the notice stated the location and points of diversion, the
proposed structures, the amount of water claimed, and the proposed
beneficial uses. The content of the published resume provided all of
the information required by section 37-92-302 (3) (a). Appellant argues
Qhat it did not have notice and would have opposed the 83CW360
application if it had known that Aurora was the applicant. However,
Park County Coalition and the residents of Park County had sufficient
notice. The information provided was consistent with that required by
statute, and the application clearly stated that the storage right might
affect the residents of Park County."
Id. (footnote omitted).

Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co.
"Essential functions of change of water right proceedings are to:
(1) identify the original appropriation's historic beneficial use; (2) fix
the historic beneficial consumptive use attributable to the
appropriation by employing a suitable parcel-by-parcel or ditch-wide
methodology; (3) determine the amount of beneficial consumptive
use attributable to the applicant's ownership interest; and (4) affix
protective conditions for preventing injury to other water rights in
operation of the judgment and decree."
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 807 (Colo.
2001) (citation omitted).

"Water engineers play an important role in change of water right
and augmentation plan proceedings.
When serving as expert
witnesses, their tasks typically include establishing: (1) the historic
beneficial consumptive use of the appropriations at issue; and (2) the
protective conditions that will maintain the conditions of the stream
upon which decreed water rights depend in order to prevent injury."
Id. (citation omitted).

"The 1981 amendment to section 304(6) extended the mandatory
inclusion of a retained jurisdiction provision to judgments and decrees
for changes of water rights, in addition to plans for augmentation....
... As a result of these amendments, the current version of section
304(6) addresses six features of a judgment and decree involving
changes of water rights and augmentation plans: (1) the judgment and
decree for changes of water rights and augmentation plans must
contain a retained jurisdiction provision for reconsidering the
question of injury to the vested rights of others; (2) the water judge
has discretion to set the period of retained jurisdiction; (3) the water
judge has discretion to extend the period of retained jurisdiction; (4)
the water judge's findings and conclusions must accompany the
condition setting forth the period of retained jurisdiction; (5) all
provisions of the judgment and decree are appealable upon their
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entry, including those relating to retained jurisdiction or extension of
retained jurisdiction; and (6) the water judge has discretion to
reconsider the injury question."
Id. at 808 (citation omitted).

"The General Assembly intended that the retained jurisdiction
provision of the decree would function as a test period for operation
of the change or augmentation plan, in order to test the prediction
and finding of non-injury the water court made upon entry of the
judgment and decree. If other water rights thereafter experience
water shortages resulting from failure to implement the protective
conditions, or because the protective conditions adopted in the
judgment and decree did not sufficiently protect against injury, the
water judge on a sufficient showing of injury reopens the inquiry into
protective conditions or, in the alternative, extends the period of
retained jurisdiction so that the test period can operate longer. In
contrast, historic consumptive use is capable of evidentiary resolution
in the process of considering and entering the judgment and decree;
exercise of the retained jurisdiction provision is not the context for
reopening these determinations."
Id. at 811.

"We conclude that the retained jurisdiction feature of section 3792-304(6) reflects two stages of future injury analysis, the first based in
some measure on predicting future effects, the second based on
operational experience. Because the water court has determined noninjury at the time of decree entry, the persons seeking to invoke
reconsideration of the injury question under the decree's retained
jurisdiction provision have the initial burden of establishing that injury
has occurred to their water rights from placing the change of water
right or augmentation plan into operation. Upon such a showing, the
burden of showing non-injury shifts to the decree holder. The water
judge may require additional or modified protective conditions to
prevent injury upon determination that such injury exists. The water
judge may also extend the period of retained jurisdiction as long as
necessary to ascertain the nonoccurrence of injury from operation of
the change or augmentation plan. If a person has met the initial
burden of establishing injury within the meaning of the retained
jurisdiction provision, and the decree holder does not meet the
burden of demonstrating non-injury, the water court abuses its
discretion if it refuses to require additional or modified protective
conditions to prevent the injury, or refuses to extend the period of
retained jurisdiction to ascertain the non-occurrence of injury."
Id. at 812.

"As we held in Midway Ranches, the consumptive use methodology
and allocations the Water Court adopts in a noticed and actually
litigated change case normally apply to subsequent change cases
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involving the same water rights. The fundamental object of a change
proceeding is to secure to owners their allocated share of historic
beneficial consumptive use determined by an appropriate parcel-byparcel or ditch-wide methodology, while protecting against injury to
other water rights when the change of water right or plan operates in
the surface and tributary groundwater stream system."
Id. at 814 (citation omitted).

Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co.
"We now hold that the owner of property burdened by a ditch
easement (hereinafter 'burdened estate') may not move or alter that
easement unless that owner has the consent of the owner of the
easement (hereinafter 'benefited estate'); OR unless that owner first
obtains a declaratory determination from a court that the proposed
changes will not significantly lessen the utility of the easement,
increase the burdens on the owner of the easement, or frustrate the
purpose for which the easement was created. We further clarify that
the right to inspect, operate, and maintain a ditch easement is a right
that cannot be abrogated by alteration or change to the ditch."
Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1231 (Colo. 2001).

"Because ditches are important, so too are the rights attendant
upon a ditch easement. The holder of a ditch easement has the right
to inspect, operate, maintain, and repair the ditch."
Id. at 1232 (citations omitted).

"Accordingly, we find ourselves at the onset of the 21st century
with competing land uses in Colorado proliferating and somewhat
unclear common-law precedent as to the interlocking rights of estates
benefiting from easements and those estates burdened by them. On
the one hand, Cherrichignostates unequivocally that a burdened estate
owner may not move a ditch easement without the consent of the
benefited estate owner. On the other hand, Stuart indicates it can be
done if the burdened owner provides an adequate substitute."
Id. at 1234 (citations omitted).

"We observe that the development of the common law on point
appears to serve two purposes: first, that ditch easements are a
property right that the burdened estate owner may not alter absent
consent of the benefited owner; and second, that there may be some
circumstances in which such alteration would work no harm to the
benefited owner and would greatly serve the burdened owner."
Id.

"The Restatement articulates the balance between burdened and
benefited estate holders as follows:
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Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement, . . . the owner
of the servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes in the
location or dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner's
expense, to permit normal use or development of the servient estate,
but only if the changes do not
a) significantly lessen the utility of the easement,
b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use
and enjoyment, or
c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created."
Id. at 1235-36 (citation omitted).
"Clearly, the best course is for the burdened owner and the
benefited owner to agree to alterations that would accommodate both
parties' use of their respective properties to the fullest extent possible.
Barring such an agreement, we do not support the self-help remedy
that Club exercised here. When a dispute arises between two property
owners, the court is the appropriate forum for the resolution of that
dispute and-in order to avoid an adverse ruling of trespass or
restoration-the burdened owner should obtain a court declaration
before commencing alterations. If a burdened owner seeks to move or
alter a ditch easement and the benefited owner refuses to consent,
then the burdened owner may seek a declaratory determination from
a court that the alteration does not damage the benefited
owner(s) ......
Id. at 1237-38.
"In evaluating damage, or the absence of damage, the trial court
must not only look at the operation of the ditch for the benefited
owner, but also look at the maintenance rights associated with the
ditch. If the maintenance rights of the owner of the ditch easement
are adversely affected by the change in the easement, then such
change does not comport with the Restatement requirements.
Furthermore, the water provided to the ditch easement owner must be
of the same quantity, quality, and timing as provided under the ditch
owner's water rights and easement rights in the ditch. A water right
operating in combination with the collection of rights and obligations
are vested property rights. They cannot simply be replaced with the
mere 'delivery' of a fixed quantity of adjudicated water. Ditches are
linear delivery systems that function as a part of a whole."
Id. at 1238 (citation and footnote omitted).
"Nonconsensual, unilateral alterations jeopardize valuable vested
property rights both in the easement and in the water rights exercised
by means of the ditch."
Id.
"We... clearly disapprove of... any
burdened estate owners in the future."
Id. at 1239.

unilateral alterations

by
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Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer
"Colorado's prior appropriation system centers on three
fundamental principles: (1) that waters of the natural stream,
including surface water and groundwater tributary thereto, are a
public resource subject to the establishment of public agency or
private use rights in unappropriated water for beneficial purposes; (2)
that water courts adjudicate the water rights and their priorities; and
(3) that the State Engineer, Division Engineers, and Water
Commissioners administer the waters of the natural stream in
accordance with the judicial decrees and statutory provisions
governing administration.
The right guaranteed under the Colorado Constitution is to the
appropriation of unappropriated waters of the natural stream, not to
the appropriation of appropriated waters."
Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Colo. 2001)

(citations omitted).
"Adjudication and administration are essential to protection of
water rights. The reason for adjudicating a water right, whether an
appropriative water right under state water law or a water right created
under federal law, is to realize the value and expectations that
enforcement through administration of that right's priority secures."
Id. at 1148-49 (citations and footnotes omitted).

"Both responses [Fellhauer and the 1969 Water Right
Determination & Administration Act] centered on: (1) reinforcing the
adjudication and administration of decreed water rights in order of
their priority; and (2) maximizing the use of Colorado's limited water
supply for as many decreed uses as possible consistent with meeting
the state's interstate delivery obligations under United States Supreme
Court equitable apportionment decrees and congressionally approved
interstate compacts."
Id. at 1150 (citation omitted).

"The General Assembly chose to implement a policy of maximum
flexibility that also protected the constitutional doctrine of prior
appropriation. Through the 1969 Act, the General Assembly created a
new statutory authorization for water uses that, when decreed, are not
subject to curtailment by priority administration. This statutory
authorization is for out-of-priority diversions for beneficial use that
operate under the terms of decreed augmentation plans....
Plans for augmentation allow diversions of water 'out-of-priority
while ensuring the protection of senior water rights.' Decreed water
rights receive a replacement water supply that offsets the out-ofpriority depletions. ... 'Depletions not adequately replaced shall result
in curtailment of the out-of-priority diversions.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
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"A person desiring to divert out of priority through the device of
an augmentation plan must file an application with the water court for
approval."
Id. at 1153 (citations omitted).

"In City of Florence, 793 P.2d at 151, we held that the General
Assembly intended to differentiate exchanges from augmentation
plans. Under section 37-83-104 and sections 37-80-120(2) through 3780-120(4), an exchange is a water management practice the State
Engineer administers between decreed points of diversion. When a
junior appropriator makes a sufficient substitute supply of water
available to a senior appropriator, the junior may divert at its
previously decreed point of diversion water that is otherwise bound for
the senior's decreed point of diversion. Four critical elements of an
exchange are that: (1) the source of substitute supply must be above
the calling water right; (2) the substitute supply must be equivalent in
amount and of suitable quality to the downstream senior appropriator;
(3) there must be available natural flow at the point of upstream
diversion; and (4) the rights of others cannot be injured when
implementing the exchange.
Justice Erickson, in his City of Florence concurring opinion,
explained the primary distinction between an exchange and a plan for
augmentation. The operator of an exchange may obtain a conditional
or absolute decree with a priority for the exchange. The State
Engineer may allow an exchange in absence of a decree confirming it.
If the exchange is adjudicated, it receives the priority date of its
appropriation, without application of the postponement doctrine,
pursuant to section 37-92-305(10). Adjudication of an exchange
assigns it a priority vis-a-vis other exchanges operating in the affected
stream reach.
In contrast, an augmentation plan operates to replace depletions
to the water supply of the natural stream upon which appropriations
depend and allows a diversion outside of the priority system; an
adjudication is required to authorize such a diversion and no priority
results."
Id. at 1155 (citations omitted).

"The consistent thread of Colorado law conjoining appropriation,
adjudication, and administration-which we have reviewed in this
opinion-establishes that, to have standing to challenge another's
water use on the basis of an alleged injury to one's water right, the
challenger must both possess a water right and obtain a decree for it."
Id. at 1156.

"'[W]ithout a judicially decreed priority date, a water right owner
has no right to request the Division Engineer to call outjunior users in
order to satisfy its own use.' Administrative action, forbearance of
enforcement, or State Engineer acquiescence in water use practices
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does not substitute forjudicial determination of use rights ....
Decreed appropriations are entitled to maintenance of the
condition of the stream existing at the time of the respective
appropriation. Lacking an adjudication of its rights, Empire Lodge
did not possess a legally cognizable right to invoke, in court, the futile
call doctrine or enlargement doctrines against the Moyers' water use.
These are rights that only decreed water rights holders have standing
to assert. Exercise of the State Engineer's enforcement discretion does
not obviate the requirement that those making water uses must obtain
a decree adjudicating their rights if they desire to have standing to
enforce them."
Id. at 1156-57 (citations omitted).

"The Moyers, on the other hand, had standing to allege injury to
their decreed water right due to Empire Lodge's out-of-priority
diversions and to seek an injunction to curtail Empire Lodge's out-ofpriority diversions.... [T]he Moyers invoked a decreed water right
and alleged injury to the right, sufficient for standing purposes to
contest Empire Lodge's undecreed water use."
Id. at 1157 (citation and footnote omitted).
"The change of water right and augmentation plan statutes provide
that applications for approval of the water use practices they
encompass are mandatory, not discretionary. They are designed to
provide notice and the opportunity for potentially affected decreed
water rights holders to participate in proceedings in order to protect
their rights. The purpose of these adjudication proceedings is not to
confirm an undecreed pre-existing change of water right or out-ofpriority diversion, but rather to: (1) authorize, deny, or condition the
change of water right or the out-of-priority diversion; and (2) allow
water rights holders like the Moyers to assert and protect their decreed
water rights."
Id. at 1158-59 (citations omitted).
"It is the role of the General Assembly, not the State Engineer or
the courts, to provide amendments to the current statutes if additional
State Engineer approval authority is desirable."
Id. at 1159.
Note- Subsequent to the announcement of Empire Lodge Homeowners'
Assoc., the General Assembly enacted Act of May 23, 2002, ch. 151, § 1,
2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 459, 459-63 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 3792-308 (2002)) (addressing substitute water supply plans).

Mount Enuons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte
"The Aspinall Unit water rights are generally subject to Colorado
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law and are further specifically subject to a subordination obligation.
The River District assigned the state adjudicated water rights for the
Unit to the BUREC on the condition that in-basin projects on the
Gunnison and its tributaries above the Unit could deplete at least
60,000 acre-feet of water. This obligation was an outgrowth of
negotiations between the River District, local interests, the United
States, and the Colorado Water Conservation Board to accommodate
development of water resources in the natural basin of the Gunnison
River. The water court has found, and this court has confirmed, that
such understanding resulted in a binding, enforceable agreement.
The effect of the subordination is to make water available for
appropriation that BUREC could otherwise call for the Unit in the
exercise of its absolute water rights."
Mount Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte, 40 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Colo.
2002) (citation omitted).

"The State strives to distribute the resource in ways that respect
historical uses without thwarting growth or entrepreneurial
development. One of the cornerstones of this state's water policy is
that the resource be administered to maximize its beneficial uses.
An applicant may commence the process of developing a
beneficial use by filing for a conditional right, defined by statute as 'a
right to perfect a water right with a certain priority upon the
completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation.'
A
conditional right is a right that serves to hold the place of the
appropriator in the 'first in time, first in right' system in effect in
Colorado. If the appropriator diligently puts the water to beneficial
use, the conditional right can mature into an 'absolute' water right,
with a priority that dates back to the initiation of the conditional
right."
Id at 1257-58 (citations omitted).

"Thus, as a prerequisite to receiving a conditional
applicants must show water is available that can be diverted."

decree,

Id. at 1258 (citation omitted).

"Typically, to satisfy the 'can and will' test, new appropriators must
convince the water court that their diversion will cause no harm to
senior appropriators: i.e., that water is available. In the Gunnison
basin, however, to satisfy the water availability test, a new, in-basin
appropriator must only convince the water court that a portion of the
60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance remains unused. Because we
have already determined that this amount was made available for inbasin users, the remaining question for the water court is only what
amount, if any, of the 60,000 acre-feet remains. This in turn depends
on the exercise of absolute decrees for in-basin, junior uses above the
Unit. We hold that the absence of a contract between Applicant and
BUREC does not preclude satisfaction of the 'water availability' test of
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the 'can and will' doctrine."
Id. at 1260 (citations omitted).

SL Group, LLC v. Go West Indus., Inc.
"Notice of proceedings to determine water rights is now provided
through the special statutory procedure set forth in section 37-92302(3).
In lieu of personal service, the statute's resume-notice
procedure is designed to put all interested parties of pending water
rights proceedings, to the extent reasonably possible, on inquiry notice
of the nature, scope, and impact of a proposed decree by requiring the
preparation of a monthly resume of applications from pertinent
information provided by the applicants, which the water clerk must
then publish in local newspapers of general circulation and mail to
potentially affected parties. In aid of the clerk's mailing obligation,
every application is required to state the name and address of the
owner or reputed owner of the land upon which any structure is or will
be located, upon which water is or will be stored, or upon which water
is or will be placed to beneficial use."
SL Group, LLC v. Go West Indus., Inc., 42 P.3d 637, 640-41 (Colo. 2002) (citations
omitted).

"The statutory scheme further protects the due process concern
for notice by, in effect, tempering the finality of a water decree in
limited circumstances involving nonparticipants whose rights are
adversely affected. Even substantive (as distinguished from merely
clerical) errors in a judgment and decree may be corrected by the
water judge upon petition within three years by any person whose
rights were adversely affected by the adjudication and who failed to file
a protest through mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect."
Id. at 641 (citation omitted).

"In the adjudication proceeding at issue here, it is clear that Go
West did not identify SL as the owner of property upon which water
from the West Shavano Extension was being used or include any
reference to SL in its application. It is also clear that the water clerk
did not mail a copy of the resume to SL. In SL's petition for
reconsideration pursuant to section 37-92-304(10), filed a year and a
half after the final decree, SL alleged that it was unaware of the
application until a year after the decree. SL's petition further alleged
not only that it and its predecessors continuously used water from the
West Shavano Extension from long before the 1989 abandonment
decree until the time of the petition, and that its historical irrigation
practices had been adversely affected by the decree granted to Go
West, but also that it owned the land upon which the historical use
offered in support of Go West's 1938 priority actually took place."
Id. at 641-42.
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"Under the circumstances of this case, the adjoining landowner's
failure to otherwise become aware of the application and file a timely
protest must be considered excusable within the meaning of section
37-92-304(10)."
Id. at 642.

Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden
"We have stated time and again that the need for security and
predictability in the prior appropriation system dictates that holders of
vested water rights are entitled to the continuation of stream
conditions as they existed at the time they first made their
appropriation. From this principle springs the equally well-established
rule that a change of water right cannot be approved if the change will
injuriously affect the vested rights of other water users. 'A classic form
of injury involves diminution of the available water supply that a water
rights holder would otherwise enjoy at the time and place and in the
amount of demand for beneficial use under the holder's decreed
water right operating in priority.'
To ensure that this most fundamental condition on the right to
change the use of a water right is satisfied, a change in use must be
accomplished '(1) by proper court decree,' (2) only for 'the extent of
use contemplated at the time of appropriation,' and (3) 'strictly
limited to the extent of formal actual usage.' ...
Implicit within these basic precepts of our prior appropriation
system is the elementary and straightforward principle that a change in
the use of a water right cannot effect an enlargement in the use of that
right."
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241, 245-46 (Colo. 2002)
(citations and footnotes omitted).

"Safeguarding junior appropriators' right to immutable stream
conditions in the face of a change from agricultural to municipal use
requires that there be parity in the consumptive use of the right before
and after the change-and that this parity endures."
Id. at 246 (citation omitted).

"Because enlargement of use constitutes a change in circumstance
sustained upon evidence that did not exist at the time of the original
change proceeding, claim preclusion does not bar relief therefor."
Id. at 247 (citations omitted).

"Nor does it bar a water court from determining the extent of
historic use under the water right in ascertaining whether there has
been an injurious enlargement.
Of course, where historic
consumptive use has been determined in a previous proceeding
relitigation of that element will not be permitted."
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Id. (citations omitted).

"Wheeler determined that 4.66 c.f.s. of Priority 12 water could be
diverted and utilized by Golden continuously during the irrigation
season without injury to junior appropriators so long as Golden did
not use this water to irrigate more than 225 acres of lawn or apply
more than 53% of this water to lawn irrigation. Because Wheeler's
calculations formed the basis of the 60s decrees, we hold that both of
these limits serve to define the permissible use Golden may make of its
Priority 12 water. Thus, we hold that Golden may irrigate up to 225
acres of lawn with up to 53%, or 900 acre-feet, of its Priority 12
entitlement....
... Appellants presented unrebutted and credible evidence that
Golden applies 1.78 acre-feet of water on each acre of lawn. Given this
application rate, Golden irrigated approximately 267 acres of lawn
with Priority 12 water. This is 42 acres more than Wheeler anticipated
would be irrigated with Priority 12 water, and is therefore an
expansion of use. However, Golden has never applied more than 476
acre-feet of Priority 12 water to lawn irrigation in any given year.
Therefore, the water court correctly concluded that Golden has not
impermissibly expanded its use of Priority 12 water by applying a
greater amount of Priority 12 water to lawn irrigation than Wheeler
anticipated in the 60s proceedings.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand this
case to the trial court with instructions that it enter an injunction
prohibiting Golden from irrigating more than 225 acres of lawn with
its Priority 12 water or from applying more than 900 acre-feet of
Priority 12 water to lawn irrigation."
Id. at 255-56.

City of Thornton v. City & County of Denver
"Section 37-92-305(3) expressly requires augmentation plans be
made with due regard for the rights of other appropriators of the same
water source.
A water court proceeding for approval of an
augmentation plan is mandatory and can be approved only if there is
'no-injurious effect' to a vested water right. Where injury is likely to
occur, terms and conditions may be included in decrees for
augmentation plans to prevent injury. If the substituted water is 'of a
quantity and quality so as to meet the requirements for which the
water of the senior appropriator has normally been used,' the
proposed substitution must be accepted."
City of Thornton v. City & County of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019, 1025 (Colo. 2002)
(citations omitted).

"Current statutory law delegates most authority over water quality
issues to the WQCC [Water Quality Control Commission]. The
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general assembly enacted the WQCA [Water Quality Control Act] in
response to the federal Clean Water Act. The purpose of the WQCA is
to prevent injury to beneficial uses made of state waters, to maximize
the beneficial uses of water, and to develop water to which Colorado
and its citizens are entitled, and, within this context, to achieve the
maximum practical degree of water quality in the waters of the state
consistent with the welfare of the state.
Thus, the Act sought to provide the maximum protection for water
quality possible without threatening the prior appropriation system
and the state's policy of maximum beneficial use of the water....
Although the WQCA gives the WQCC general authority over water
quality issues, the WQCA is not intended to interfere with the water
court's role in adjudicating water rights administered by the State
Engineer. Section 25-8-104(1) of the WQCA explicitly provides that:
No provision of this article shall be interpreted so as to supercede,
abrogate, or impair rights to divert water and to apply water to
beneficial uses in accordance with sections 5 and 6 of article XVI of
the constitution of the state of Colorado, compacts entered into by
the state of Colorado, or the provisions of articles 80 to 93 of title 37,
C.R.S., or Colorado court determinations with respect to the
determination and administration of water rights.
We read these provisions of the WCQA to allow the WCQA to work
within the context of the prior appropriation system."
Id. at 1028-29 (citations and footnotes omitted).

"The WRDAA [1969 Water Rights Determination and
Administration Act] explicitly requires the water court to consider
water quality issues in the case of an augmentation plan in which water
is being actively substituted into a stream for the use of other
appropriators. The substituted water must be of a quality and
continuity to meet the requirements for which the water of the senior
appropriator has normally been used."
Id. at 1030 (citations omitted).

"Despite the general assembly's assignment of water quality issues
to the WQCC, the language of the WQCA clearly expresses a legislative
intent for water quality issues to remain within the purview of the water
court as set forth in the WRDAA. Section 25-8-104(1) explicitly states
that the water court retains authority over the question of whether
material injury to water rights exists and the remedy for such injury.
Injury occurs under the WRDAA where the water provided by an
augmentation plan is not of a quality and quantity so as to meet the
requirements for which the water of the senior appropriator has
normally been used. The WRDAA and the WQCA therefore preserve
the common law standard that the introduction of pollutants into a
water supply constitutes injury to senior appropriators if the water is
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no longer suitable for the senior appropriator's normal use because of
the substitute supply."
Id. (citations omitted).

"The legislature provided for both a determination of non-injury
to senior appropriators at the time of the initial decree approving an
augmentation plan, and a period of retained jurisdiction during which
the water court could reconsider its initial determination of non-injury
in light of the actual operation of the plan. Although Thornton
initially agreed that it would not be injured by the use of Bi-City
effluent in Denver's Augmentation Plan, the stipulation governed only
the water court's initial determination of non-injury to Thornton
during the first stage of the injury analysis. The second stage of the
injury analysis occurs later, once an augmentation plan becomes
operational. The question of operational injury remained open for
reconsideration at the second stage of the injury analysis under the
retained jurisdiction provision."
Id. at 1031 (citations omitted).

"In the interest of finality, the water court sets the period of
retained jurisdiction at the period of time it finds necessary to
preclude or remedy any injury that may emerge once the
augmentation plan becomes operational. The retained jurisdiction
provision therefore provides the water court with flexibility to
implement programs that maximize the beneficial use of water without
sacrificing the vested water rights of Thornton and other senior
appropriators.
Retained jurisdiction should be invoked where the actual
operation of an augmentation plan reveals that substituted water is
unsuitable for a senior appropriator's normal use of the water in
comparison to the quality of the water it would otherwise receive at its
point of diversion if the augmentation plan had not been instituted."
Id. at 1032 (citations omitted).

Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch
"[B]ecause the declaratory judgment act is to be liberally
construed; because resolution of property ownership issues affecting
water use rights is established in our case law as a proper matter for
water court determination; and because PCSR has stated that,
whatever action we might take with respect to its pending conditional
decree application appeal, it intends to rejoin the property ownership
issue by re-filing its application, we find that the case before us is not
moot."
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 45 P.3d 693, 699 (Colo.
2002) (footnote omitted).
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"Some states that allocate their surface water by the principles of
prior appropriation nevertheless allocate ground water by a rule of
capture that permits overlying landowners to possess the ground water
appearing under their land without regard to the effect of its
extraction upon other ground water and surface water users.
However, such a rule of capture defies hydrologic reality and impairs
the security and reliability of senior water use rights that depend on an
interconnected ground and surface water system. Colorado law
contains a presumption that all ground water is tributary to the surface
stream unless proved or provided by statute otherwise."
Id. at 701-02 (citation and footnotes omitted).

"The extent of underground storage available for artificial
recharge without interfering with the aquifer's natural recharge
capacity or injuring senior ground or surface water rights is a central
issue in any proposal to use an aquifer for artificial recharge and
Some aquifers may be more suitable for storage of
storage....
artificially recharged water than others.
Whether a particular aquifer can accommodate a proposed
conjunctive use project is a factor to consider in a Water Court decree
application in Colorado and the determination will turn upon the facts
of the case."
Id. at 703 (citations omitted).

"The General Assembly's authorization for conjunctive use projects
implements basic tenets of Colorado water law that the legislature has
clearly enunciated: (1) a natural stream consists of all underflow and
tributary waters; (2) all waters of the natural stream are subject to
appropriation, adjudication, and administration in the order of their
decreed priority; (3) the policy of the state is to integrate the
appropriation, use, and administration of underground water tributary
to a stream with the use of surface water in such a way as to maximize
the beneficial use of all of the waters of the state; and (4) the
conjunctive use of ground and surface water shall be recognized to the
fullest extent possible, subject to the preservation of other existing
vested rights in accordance with the law."
Id. at 704-05 (citations omitted).

"Construing the General Assembly's wording and intent and
effectuating evident legislative purposes, we determine that the
General Assembly has authorized the issuance of decrees for artificial
recharge and storage of water in an aquifer when the decree holder
lawfully captures, possesses, and controls water and then places it into
the aquifer for subsequent beneficial use. The applicant bears the
burden of demonstrating that the aquifer is capable of being utilized
for the recharge and storage of the applicant's water without
impairment to the decreed water rights of senior surface or ground
water users who depend upon the aquifer for supply."
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Id. at 705 (footnote omitted).

"Based upon the principles of Colorado law embodied in the
statutes and our case law, the applicant would have to meet conditions
to utilize an aquifer for storage of artificially recharged water. The
applicant, at least: (1) must capture, possess, and control the water it
intends to put into the aquifer; (2) must not injure other water use
rights, either surface or underground, by appropriating the water for
recharge; (3) must not injure water use rights, either surface or
underground, as a result of recharging the aquifer and storing water in
it; (4) must show that the aquifer is capable of accommodating the
stored water without injuring other water use rights; (5) must show
that the storage will not tortiously interfere with overlying landowners'
use and enjoyment of their property; (6) must not physically invade
the property of another by activities such as directional drilling, or
occupancy by recharge structures or extraction wells, without
proceeding under the procedures for eminent domain; (7) must have
the intent and ability to recapture and use the stored water; and (8)
must have an accurate means for measuring and accounting for the
water stored and extracted from storage in the aquifer."
Id. at n.19.

"Advancing the national agenda of settling the public domain
required abandonment of the pre-existing common-law rules of
property ownership in regard to water and water use rights. Reducing
the public land and water to possession and ownership was a
preoccupation of territorial and state law from the outset. A new law
of custom and usage in regard to water use rights and land ownership
rights, the 'Colorado Doctrine,' arose from 'imperative necessity' in
the western region. This new doctrine established that: (1) water is a
public resource, dedicated to the beneficial use of public agencies and
private persons wherever they might make beneficial use of the water
under use rights established as prescribed by law; (2) the right of water
use includes the right to cross the lands of others to place water into,
occupy and convey water through, and withdraw water from the
natural water bearing formations within the state in the exercise of a
water use right; and (3) the natural water bearing formations may be
used for the transport and retention of appropriated water. This new
common law established a property-rights-based allocation and
administration system which promotes multiple use of a finite resource
for beneficial purposes."
Id. at 706 (citation and footnote omitted).

"Upon adoption of Colorado's constitution, the state struck an
accommodation between two kinds of property interests-water use
rights and land rights-by requiring the owners of water use rights to
obtain the consent of, or pay just compensation to, owners of land in,
upon, or across which the water right holders constructed dams,
reservoirs, ditches, canals, flumes, or other manmade facilities for the
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diversion, conveyance, or storage of water.
But, this requirement does not extend to vesting in landowners the
right to prevent access to the water source or require compensation
for the water use right holder's employment of the natural water
bearing surface and subsurface formations on or within the
landowners' properties for the movement of its appropriated water."
Id. at 708 (citation and footnote omitted).

"In deference to the laws of nature, which we held to be
foundational in Yunker v. Nichols, Colorado law does not recognize a
land ownership right by which the Landowners can claim control of
the aquifers as part of their bundle of sticks. To the contrary, '[a]s
knowledge of the science of hydrology advanced, it became clear that
natural streams are surface manifestations of extensive tributary
systems, including underground water in stream basins,' and passage
of appropriated water through the natural streams is part of the
Colorado law of water use rights. However, Article XVI, section 7 does
subject the construction of artificial water facilities on another's land
to the payment of just compensation and grants a right of private
condemnation for the construction of such waterworks.. .
Id. at 709 (citations omitted).

"In sum, the holders of water use rights may employ underground
as well as surface water bearing formations in the state for the
placement of water into, occupation of water in, conveyance of water
through, and withdrawal of water from the natural water bearing
formations in the exercise of water use rights....
We reject the Landowners' claim that the cujus doctrine provides
them with a property right to require consent for artificial recharge
and storage of water in aquifers that extend through their land."
Id. at 710 (citations and footnote omitted).

"[A] n applicant for a conditional decree to utilize available aquifer
storage space must demonstrate that it will capture, possess, and
control water lawfully available to it and, without injury to other water
rights, will artificially recharge that water into the aquifer, such as
through a constructed injection well or structure built on the land's
surface.
To obtain an absolute decree for aquifer storage, the
applicant must artificially recharge the water into the aquifer pursuant
to a decreed water use right for storage and subsequent beneficial
use."
I& at 712.

"In so providing, the General Assembly preserved the requirement
of proceeding by eminent domain for the construction of waterworks
facilities under section 37-87-101(1), including artificial recharge
structures and wells, when such features are located on or in another's
land without consent.
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Article XVI, section 7, Article II, sections 14 and 15, and section 3787-101 (1) establish a private right of condemnation of private property
through eminent domain for 'those interests in real property
reasonably necessary for the construction, maintenance, or operation
of any water storage projects.' ...

In the case before us, the proposed project facilities include
constructed wells, dams, recharge reservoirs, and other water works,
but the project does not include the location of any artificial features
on or in the Landowners' properties. Thus, PCSR would not need the
consent of the Landowners or an easement, nor would it have to pay
just compensation to them, and no trespass occurs simply as the result
of water moving into an aquifer and being contained or migrating in
the course of the aquifer's functioning underneath the lands of
another."
Id. at 713-14 (citations omitted).

"Allowing property owners to control who may store water in
natural formations, or charging water right use holders for easements
to occupy the natural water bearing surface or underground
formations with their appropriated water, would revert to common-law
ownership principles that are antithetical to Colorado water law and
the public's interest in a secure, reliable, and flexible water supply
made available through the exercise of decreed water use rights. It
would disharmonize Colorado's historical balance between water use
rights and land ownership rights. It would inflate and protract
litigation by adding condemnation actions to procedures for obtaining
water use decrees. It would counter the state's goals of optimum use,
efficient water management, and priority administration."
Id. at 714 (citation omitted).

State Engineer v. Bradley
"Diversions are implicitly limited to an amount sufficient for the
purpose for which the appropriation was made, without waste or
excessive use. A diversion of water decreed for irrigation purposes is
limited by the 'duty of water' with respect to the decreed place of use.
In addition, diversions are implicitly limited in quantity by historic use
at the original decreed point of diversion.
The actual historic
diversion for beneficial use could be less than the optimum utilization
represented by the duty of water in any particular case, either because
the well or other facility involved cannot physically produce at the
decreed rate on a continuing basis, or because that amount has simply
not been historically needed or applied for the decreed purpose.
In the past, we have explained this limitation by noting that 'over
an extended period of time a pattern of historic diversions and use
under the decreed right at its place of use will mature and become the
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measure of the water right for change purposes.'
State Engineer v. Bradley, 53 P.3d 1165, 1169 (Colo. 2002) (citations and footnote
omitted).

"The acreage under irrigation is a common basis of measuring the
use of water in the adjudication of priorities, but if the same acreage is
also being irrigated by water from appropriations other than the one
for which a change is sought, some measure of the applicable
appropriation's historic contribution to the duty of water is necessary
to determine its historic use and ensure that the appropriation will not
be enlarged by the change."
Id. at 1170 (citation omitted).

"Bradley's property has been served by at least three distinct water
sources for over sixty years. The record contained no suggestion that
the well had ever been the sole source of water for the acreage in
question, even during the two years since the implementation of the
center-pivot sprinklers. Though he made no attempt to quantify the
contribution of his surface water rights to the overall duty of water on
the irrigated acreage, the record indicated that the ground water
appropriation, for which the change was sought, was used only in a
supplemental capacity, being applied each year only later in the
growing season, after the available surface water ran out. Because
Bradley's application requested enough water from the new point of
diversion to irrigate, by itself, 128 acres of the same 150 acre-field, his
burden required, at the least, a demonstration that historic diversions
from the corner well amounted to approximately eighty-five percent of
the water historically applied to the entire field. The record failed to
support, and was almost certainly inconsistent with, such a
determination.
The inadequacy of the applicant's presentation was not due merely
to a lack of precision or accuracy in quantifying historic use. It
resulted from a conceptual failure to distinguish actual historic use
from the face amount of the decree, and therefore a failure to even
attempt to establish the historic use of the well-water, separate and
apart from historic use of the applicant's surface water. In approving
the request, the water court appears to have conflated the historic use
of the land as a whole with the historic use of the groundwater.
Admirable as the applicant's attempt to improve the efficiency of his
irrigation technique may have been, a water right is a property right,
which can be sold or further changed once it is established. An
enlargement of the applicant's right would at the very least have the
effect of advancing his priority to any additional water over that of
junior appropriators, and in the overappropriated systems of the San
Luis Valley it would necessarily be injurious to other vested rights."
Id. at 1170-71.
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Double RL Co. v. Telluray Ranch Properties
"Both sections 301(4) (a) (I) and 305(7) use the word 'shall' and
are therefore mandatory. If section 301 (4) (a) (I) is applied, as it was in
this case, without the required notice of section 305(7), such an
application would render the notice provision of section 305(7)
inoperative to accomplish the legislative intent of preventing loss of a
conditional water right.
The only interpretation that provides
harmonious effect to the language and legislative intent of both
section 301(4) (a) (I) and section 305(7) is to require that the water
court provide notice to an owner of a conditional water right before
the right expires or is canceled-even when the holder of the right
fails to file within the statutory time period an application for a finding
of reasonable diligence. The water court's failure to give notice only
extends the time period in which the diligence application may be
filed. It does not relieve the applicant of its burden to prove that
reasonable diligence occurred during the six year diligence period.
Therefore, we hold that the water court may not cancel a
conditional water right and the conditional water right does not expire
without first providing notice of cancellation or expiration under
section 305(7)."
Double RL Co. v. Telluray Ranch Properties, 54 P.3d 908, 912 (2002) (citation
omitted).

West Elk Ranch v. United States
"Indeed, the General Assembly eliminated a 'wait and see'
approach to determining conditional water rights. Instead, it opted to
require an applicant to show in the conditional decree proceedings
that it 'can and will' complete the appropriation of water with
diligence and within a reasonable time before a court may issue a
conditional decree."
West Elk Ranch v. United States, No. 02SA93, slip op. at 6 (Colo. Dec. 2, 2002).

"Here, we have to determine if West Elk has made the requisite
showing that it 'can and will' develop the water pursuant to its plan.
Because the Forest Service's denial of the SUP eliminates the only
alternative available to West Elk, this case is more similar to FWS than
to In re Gibbs.
West Elk argues that it still may obtain a permit; however, there is
no evidence in the file indicating a pending appeal or other
proceeding that will potentially result in the issuance of an SUP to
West Elk.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, and the
regulations that implement the Act, grant the Forest Service the
authority to issue Special Use Permits for National Forest land.
Applicants must seek a permit from the Forest Ranger or Supervisor
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with jurisdiction over the affected area, but the application itself does
not convey any use rights. Upon receipt of the application, the Forest
Service does an initial screening for minimum requirements. If the
applicant cannot meet the minimum standards, the Forest Service will
deny the application without further consideration. Here, the Forest
Service District Ranger denied West Elk's SUP application because it
failed to meet a minimum requirement that the SUP cannot conflict
or interfere with National Forest uses. Upon review, the Supervisor
agreed.
Without an SUP, West Elk cannot put the water to beneficial use.
West Elk presented insufficient evidence to the water court to
demonstrate a substantial probability that it will eventually obtain an
SUP.
Accordingly, the water court properly granted summary
judgment against West Elk."
Id. at 9-11 (citations and footnote omitted).

